McGeorge Bundy left his tenure at Harvard to join Kennedy's team in 1961, as one of the "best and the brightest." For eight years he was the national security adviser to Kennedy and Johnson. McGeorge Bundy was, with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, one of the Administration officials that pressed for a bombing halt and a rethinking of the U.S. strategy in late 1965.

Bundy was a member of the committee of "wise men" that in 1968 recommended a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

January 6, 1964 Memorandum to the President
From the Historian of the State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i/1_27.html (Scroll to Doc. #8)

McGeorge Bundy sent this Memorandum to Johnson in response to Senator Mike Mansfield's views on Vietnam (the Senator's memo is Doc. #2 on the same web page). Bundy attached memos on the issue from State Secretary Dean Rusk and McNamara to one of his own. The Domino Theory is fully applied here to justify increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Cronology of events regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident
From the Historian of the State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i/255_308.html (Scroll down to Doc. #272)

McGeorge Bundy drafted this Top Secret chronology of events for President Johnson.

Draft of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
From the Historian of the State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i/255_308.html (Scroll down to Doc. #278)

The National Security Council, headed by McGeorge Bundy, presented the President with a draft resolution to be passed by Congress authorizing the President to "respond instantly with the use of appropriate force to repel any unprovoked attack against the armed forces of the United States and [...] to take [...] all measures including the use of armed force to assist that nation in the defense of its political independence and territorial integrity against aggression or subversion." Here is the final resolution as passed by Congress. The draft was prepared by William Bundy's team.

April 6, 1965, National Security Action Memorandum No. 328 on combat troop deployment
From the Historian of the State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/241_260.html (Doc. #242

McGeorge Bundy informs McNamara and Rusk of a series of decisions, including the deployment of two marine battalions in South Vietnam.

April 10, 1965, Memorandum to Rusk on reducing flow of information to the press
From the Historian of the State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/241_260.html (Doc. #247

McGeorge Bundy tells Rusk that the President is very concerned with the abundant information about military operations being released to the press, and adds that Johnson "...does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped."

June 30, 1965 Memorandum to Defense Secretary McNamara on the risks of troop deployment
From Mark Bradley's Page at the University of Milwaukee
http://www.uwm.edu/~mbradley/mcgeorgedoc1.html

In this Memorandum to McNamara, Bundy explains the risks and shortcomings of the expansion of U.S. deployment in South Vietnam.

June 30, 1965 Memorandum to President Johnson comparing the French situation in 1954, and the U.S. situation in 1965 regarding Vietnam
From Mark Bradley's Page at the University of Milwaukee
http://www.uwm.edu/~mbradley/mcgeorgedoc2.html

Interesting analysis in which Bundy compares the situation of France in Vietnam, 1954, and that of the U.S. in 1965, including their respective "home fronts."

July 1, 1965 Memo to President Johnson discussing the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam raised by George Ball
From the Historian of the State Department
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/040.html (Scroll down to Doc. #43)

McGeorge Bundy presents Johnson with proposed courses of action drafted by George Ball, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and William Bundy.